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Sharing a quantum secret without a trusted party
Qin Li1,2,∗, Dong Yang Long1, W. H. Chan2, Dao Wen Qiu1
1Department of Computer Science, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510006 China
2Department of Mathematics, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China
Abstract In a conventional quantum (k, n) threshold scheme, a trusted party shares a secret quantum
state with n participants such that any k of those participants can cooperate to recover the original secret,
while fewer than k participants obtain no information about the secret. In this paper we show how to
construct a quantum (k, n) threshold scheme without the assistance of a trusted party, who generates
and distributes shares among the participants. Instead, each participant chooses his private state and
contributes the same to the determination of the final secret quantum state.
Keywords Quantum secret sharing · Quantum cryptography · Quantum information processing ·
Quantum communication
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1 Introduction
Suppose that n shareholders who are not mutually trusted want to share a password, with which they
can open the vault and get access to some confidential documents of the company. It should be done
in such a way that any k of those shareholders have the ability to reconstruct the password, while fewer
than k shareholders cannot. The solutions vary under two different situations. If there exists a trusted
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party who generates and distributes suitable shares among the shareholders, then the problem could be
addressed by classical (k, n) threshold schemes independently introduced by Blakley [1] and Shamir [2].
And if there does not exist such a party trusted by all of the shareholders, then classical (k, n) threshold
schemes without the assistance of any trusted party came to rescue [3–5].
With the emergence of quantum computation and quantum communication, it is natural to consider
the quantum counterparts of secret sharing schemes. Hillery et al. showed how to implement a classical
threshold scheme using Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) states in the presence of eavesdroppers, and
also showed how to share an unknown qubit between two participants such that only the collaboration of
two participants could reconstruct the original qubit [6]. Karlsson et al. presented a secret sharing scheme
based on two-particle quantum entanglement, in which quantum information is sent from a sender Trent
to Alice and Bob so that both persons are needed to obtain the information, and showed that it could be
extended to a special quantum (k, n) threshold scheme based on multi-particle entangled states [7]. Cleve
et al. gave an efficient construction of more general quantum (k, n) threshold schemes, where a trusted
party can share an unknown quantum state with n participants such that k participants are necessary
and sufficient to reconstruct the original secret quantum state [8]. Thereafter quantum secret sharing has
been an active research field and many quantum secret sharing schemes using various techniques have been
proposed [9–20].
Whereas most previous quantum (k, n) threshold schemes have been considered with the assistance of
a trusted party [6–20], here we consider the problem of sharing a quantum secret without having a trusted
party. Actually, for lots of applications such as conference key agreement and distributed computing with
faulty processors, quantum secret sharing without a trusted party is a powerful tool. Also, as referred
by Ingemarsson and Simmons [3], the situation that there is nobody trusted by all of the participants is
more common in commercial and/or international applications. In this case, previously proposed quantum
secret schemes do not play the role well. Therefore, in this paper we give a basic construction for sharing
a quantum secret in the absence of a trusted party and illustrate its feasibility mainly by improving the
quantum (k, n) threshold scheme presented by Cleve et al. [8] to eliminate the need of the trusted party.
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The novelty is that a trusted party is unnecessary and each participant acts for his own benefit.
2 Quantum (k, n) threshold schemes without a trusted party
In this section, we show how to solve the problem of sharing a quantum secret without the aid of any
trusted party, drawing ideas from classical counterparts [3–5]. The problem could be stated more clearly
as follows:
• all of the participants choose their own private quantum states, which must be made available in
sequence for the final secret quantum state to be generated;
• all of the participants contribute identically to determining the quantum secret;
• the participants share the secret quantum state in a way that the collaboration of any k out of
n participants can recover the secret quantum state, but the collaboration of any k − 1 or fewer
participants obtain no information about it.
Such a scheme is called a quantum (k, n) threshold scheme without a trusted party. In such a scheme, each
participant acts for his own benefit and need not trust a single party unless at least k participants work
together. In addition, notice n < 2k for a quantum (k, n) threshold scheme without a trusted party, which
is guaranteed by quantum no-cloning theorem [21].
The basic method used for constructing a quantum (k, n) threshold scheme without a trusted party is
introduced in the following.
(1) Each participant Pi (i = 0, 1, · · · , n−1) randomly selects his private quantum state ρi which can be
a component of the quantum secret, or belong to the same domain as that of the secret quantum state to
be reconstructed. The specific form of the quantum secret can vary with different applications and should
be defined before implementing the protocol.
(2) Pi acts as a trusted party and splits his private quantum state ρi into n shares ρij (j = 0, 1, · · · , n−1)
using a conventional quantum (k, n) threshold scheme such as [8], and then sends each share ρij to the
participant Pj in sequence (particularly Pi keeps ρii).
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(3) When Pi has received the share ρji from the participants Pj , he can do nothing or implement
corresponding operations on ρji and his quantum registers. Note that such operations are agreed before
the protocol and vary with the conventional quantum (k, n) threshold schemes used. If Pi has received
the shares ρji (j = 0, 1, · · · , n− 1) and implemented the corresponding operations by some time (the time
limit is agreed before the protocol), he announces that he has completed his actions; else if Pi has not get
the share from some party Pl, he also reveals this fact.
(4) If at least k parties have not received the shares from some party Pl before the time limit, they
consider Pl a quitter and not a real player. If the number of quitters is not exceeding n− k, the protocol
cannot be affected and just the value of n decreases; otherwise the protocol aborts. After all of the real
participants have announced, any k participants can cooperate to obtain the final secret quantum state ρs
which each participant’s private state ρi contributes equally to by a preconcerted way, while less than k
participants obtain no information about ρs except their own private states.
Note that we should assume that each participant must logically be willing to share the private quantum
state chosen by himself with other participants and contribute the same to determining the final secret
quantum state. Otherwise a malicious participant who sends an improper quantum states can make k
participants reconstruct a wrong quantum secret and thus make the protocol abort, even though doing
such things is of no use for him. In addition, the security of such a quantum (k, n) threshold scheme
without having a trusted party largely depends on the conventional quantum (k, n) threshold scheme used
by each participant to protect his private state among the other participants before the recovery phase.
3 Concrete quantum (k, n) threshold schemes without a trusted party
In order to clarify the feasibility of the construction of a quantum (k, n) threshold scheme without a
trusted party introduced by us, we give a couple of schemes. Besides, it is only necessary for us to consider
real players’ actions, since the construction method has ensured that if at most n − k players drop out
midway, the protocol will not be affected.
one scheme can be achieved as follows just by utilizing the operations included in a conventional quan-
tum (k, n) threshold scheme such as that in [6–8]: each participant shares the private state chosen by
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himself with the other participants using a conventional quantum (k, n) threshold scheme; if a participant
has obtained the shares and performed accordingly, he makes an announcement that his task has been
finished; then any k players recover each participant’s private state using the conventional recovery pro-
cedure; and such k players obtain the final secret from all of the recovered private states by implementing
the agreed operations. Obviously, the processes of this scheme can accord with that of the proposed
construction method and the trusted party is removed indeed. Nevertheless, the conventional recovery
procedure has to be implemented for n times and then the negotiated operations should be applied on n
private states to obtain a secret.
Another concrete scheme is based on the quantum (k, n) threshold scheme presented by Cleve et al. [8].
We improve it to remove the use of the trusted party. The improved scheme can allow all of the participants
to choose their own private state and have the same influence on determining the final quantum secret.
Note n < 2k and that the dimension of each share can be bounded above by 2max(2k− 1,m) through
efficient quantum operations, where m is the dimension of the private quantum state to be encoded, the
same as that in [8]. In addition, we just need to consider the special case where n = 2k−1, since a quantum
(k, n) threshold scheme with n < 2k−1 can be obtained by discarding 2k−1−n shares from any (k, 2k−1)
threshold scheme with n > k [8]. Our improved scheme without the aid of the trusted party includes three
parts: scheme setup, secret quantum state generation, and secret quantum state reconstruction.
3.1 Scheme setup
Given k, n and m, find a suitable prime q satisfying max(n,m) ≤ q ≤ 2max(n,m) (which is always
possible according to Bertrand’s postulate [22]) and set a finite field F = Zq. For i = 0, 1, · · · , n − 1, let
ci = (ci,0, ci,1, · · · , ci,k−1) ∈ F
k, define the polynomial as pci(t) = ci,0 + ci,1t + · · · + ci,k−1t
k−1, and let
xi ∈ F and each xi should be different from each other. Then a q-ary quantum state which is defined on
basis states |si〉 (si ∈ F) could be encoded by the linear mapping as
|si〉 →
∑
ci ∈ F
k, ci,k−1 = si
|pci(x0), pci(x1), · · · , pci(xn−1)〉. (1)
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Define the resulting state of adding a q-ary quantum basis state |si〉 to the quantum register in a q-ary
quantum basis state |sj〉 as |si + sj〉|si〉 (si, sj ∈ F), which can be encoded by the linear mapping as
∑
ci, cj ∈ F
k
ci,k−1 = si, cj,k−1 = sj
|pci(x0) + pcj (x0), · · · , pci(xn−1) + pcj (xn−1)〉|pci(x0), · · · , pci(xn−1)〉. (2)
Also define the operation applying an invertible l× l matrix M to a sequence of l quantum registers as
applying the mapping
|(y0, y1, · · · , yl−1)〉 → |(y0, y1, · · · , yl−1)M〉. (3)
For z0, z1, · · · , zl−1 ∈ F, introduce the l × l Vandermonde matrix [Vl(z0, z1, · · · , zl−1)]ij = z
i
j (i, j ∈
{0, 1, · · · , l − 1}). And notice that
|(ci,0, ci,1, · · · , ci,l−1)Vl(z0, z1, · · · , zl−1)〉
= |pci(z0), pci(z1), · · · , pci(zl−1)〉, (4)
where ci = (ci,0, ci,1, · · · , ci,l−1) ∈ F
l.
In addition, suppose that each participant Pi (i = 0, 1, · · · , n−1) owns a local quantum register Ri and
n common quantum registers Ci,j (j = 0, 1, · · · , n− 1) and every register is in an initial state |0〉 (0 ∈ F).
3.2 Secret quantum state generation
In this phase, Pi (i = 0, 1, · · · , n − 1) will adopt a method of encoding by employing a polynomial of
degree k − 1 denoted as pci(t) = ci,0 + ci,1t+ · · ·+ ci,k−1t
k−1, where ci = (ci,0, ci,1, · · · , ci,k−1) ∈ F
k.
Pi randomly chooses and prepares his own private q-ary quantum state |si〉 (si ∈ F) and uses the
encoding denoted as (1) to obtain
∑
ci ∈ F
k, ci,k−1 = si
|pci(x0), pci(x1), · · · , pci(xn−1)〉. (5)
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Note that the above operation implies that the quantum state |si〉 is split into n shares which are stored
in the quantum registers Ci,j (j = 0, 1, · · · , n− 1). Then Pi sends the share in the register Ci,j to Pj for
j = 0, 1, · · · , n− 1 (including himself) sequently in an authenticated way.
When Pi receives a share, he adds the received state to the quantum register Ri. And if Pi has obtained
the shares from all of the participants and implemented all the corresponding operations, he announces
that his actions have been finished. After all of the participants have announced, it is not difficult to
obtain that n+ n2 quantum registers R0, R1, · · · , Rn−1, C0,0, C0,1, · · · , Cn−1,n−1 are in a global state
∑
ci ∈ F
k, ci,k−1 = si
for i = 0, · · · , n− 1
|
n−1∑
i=0
pci(x0), · · · ,
n−1∑
i=0
pci(xn−1)〉 ⊗
n−1
i=0 |pci(x0), · · · , pci(xn−1)〉. (6)
Then, let the final agreed secret quantum state be |s〉 (for s =
∑
i
si =
∑
i
ci,k−1 and s ∈ F) if all the
participants are required to provide q-ary quantum basis states before the scheme. In this case, we shall
see that the final secret can be recovered using the conventional recovery procedure only once. However,
if players can be allowed to provide a superposition of basis states, their private states may entangle with
the resulting state after performing operations on them. So the final secret state should be defined in a
different way, such as a superposition of states |
n−1∑
i=0
si〉 ⊗
n−1
i=0 |si〉(si ∈ F) or measuring the superposition
state using the computational basis in Fn+1 and taking the collapsed state |
n−1∑
i=0
si〉 in the first register as
a final secret. The form of the final secret can vary with the specific applications and should be negotiated
before implementing the scheme.
3.3 Secret quantum state reconstruction
In this part, we show that the collaboration of any k participants can reconstruct the agreed secret
quantum state |s〉 by the following steps. Suppose that the first k participants, namely P0, P1, · · · , Pk−1,
gather together and want to recover the secret, so we obtain the information about the fist k quantum
registers (that is, R0, · · · , Rk−1) and kn common quantum registers (namely, Ci,j for i = 0, · · · , n− 1 and
j = 0, · · · , k − 1).
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(1) Apply Vk(x0, x1, · · · , xk−1)
−1 which represents the inverse of Vk(x0, x1, · · · , xk−1) to the first k
quantum registers R0, R1, · · · , Rk−1. Then the global state of the n+ n
2 quantum registers is
∑
ci ∈ F
k
, ci,k−1 = si
for i = 0, · · · , n− 1
|
n−1∑
i=0
ci,0, · · · ,
n−1∑
i=0
ci,k−1〉|
n−1∑
i=0
pci(xk), · · · ,
n−1∑
i=0
pci(xn−1)〉 ⊗
n−1
i=0 |pci(x0), · · · , pci(xn−1)〉. (7)
(2) Shift the first k quantum registers by one to the right in sequence by setting R0, R1, · · · , Rk−1 to
Rk−1, R0, · · · , Rk−2. At this time, the global state of the n+ n
2 quantum registers is
∑
ci ∈ F
k, ci,k−1 = si
for i = 0, · · · , n− 1
|
n−1∑
i=0
ci,k−1,
n−1∑
i=0
ci,0, · · · ,
n−1∑
i=0
ci,k−2〉|
n−1∑
i=0
pci (xk), · · · ,
n−1∑
i=0
pci (xn−1)〉 ⊗
n−1
i=0 |pci (x0), · · · , pci (xn−1)〉
=
∑
ci ∈ F
k, ci,k−1 = si
for i = 0, · · · , n− 1
|s〉|
n−1∑
i=0
ci,0, · · · ,
n−1∑
i=0
ci,k−2〉|
n−1∑
i=0
pci (xk), · · · ,
n−1∑
i=0
pci (xn−1)〉 ⊗
n−1
i=0 |pci (x0), · · · , pci (xn−1)〉. (8)
If the state in R0 is a basis state |s〉 (for some s ∈ F), it can be the final secret quantum state and
the recovery procedure has been done; otherwise we should continue the recovery procedure. Actually, a
participant usually offers a superposition of basis states, so the register R0 is entangled with the other
registers, since in (8) the value of |s〉 can be determined by any of the kets
|
n−1∑
i=0
ci,0, · · · ,
n−1∑
i=0
ci,k−2〉|
n−1∑
i=0
pci(xk), · · · ,
n−1∑
i=0
pci(xn−1)〉 ⊗
n−1
i=0 |pci(x0), · · · , pci(xn−1)〉. (9)
(3) Apply Vk−1(xk, xk+1, · · · , xn−1) to the quantum registersR1, R2, · · · , Rk−1 and add R0·(xk+i−1)
k−1
to Ri for all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k − 1}. And the global state of the n+ n
2 quantum registers is
∑
ci ∈ F
k, ci,k−1 = si
for i = 0, · · · , n − 1
|s〉|
n−1∑
i=0
pci (xk), · · · ,
n−1∑
i=0
pci (xn−1)〉|
n−1∑
i=0
pci (xk), · · · ,
n−1∑
i=0
pci (xn−1)〉 ⊗
n−1
i=0 |pci (x0), · · · , pci (xn−1)〉.(10)
(4) The first k parties perform the similar operations that were applied to the registersR0, R2, · · · , Rk−1
in steps (1), (2) and (3) of the state reconstruction phase on the registers Ci,0, Ci,1, · · · , Ci,k−1 for i =
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0, 1, · · · , n− 1. Then the global state of the n+ n2 quantum registers should be
∑
ci ∈ F
k, ci,k−1 = si
for i = 0, · · · , n− 1
|s〉|
n−1∑
i=0
pci(xk), · · · ,
n−1∑
i=0
pci(xn−1)〉|
n−1∑
i=0
pci(xk), · · · ,
n−1∑
i=0
pci(xn−1)〉
⊗n−1i=0 (|si〉|pci(xk), · · · , pci(xn−1)〉|pci(xk), · · · , pci(xn−1)〉). (11)
(5) Shift the registers possessed by the first participant P0 (namely, R0, C0,0, · · · , Cn−1,0) to be first
n+ 1 registers. For i = (0, 1, · · · , k − 1), since there is a unique array ci ∈ F
k with ci,k−1 = si such that
pci(xk+j−1 ) = yi,j for any j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k − 1}, the state denoted as Eq. (11) can be rewritten as
|s〉 ⊗n−1i=0 |si〉
∑
ci ∈ F
k, ci,k−1 = si
for i = 0, · · · , n− 1
|
n−1∑
i=0
yi,1, · · · ,
n−1∑
i=0
yi,k−1〉|
n−1∑
i=0
yi,1, · · · ,
n−1∑
i=0
yi,k−1〉
⊗n−1i=0 (|yi,1, · · · , yi,k−1〉|yi,1, · · · , yi,k−1〉). (12)
From the Eq. (12), if all the participants provide q-ary quantum basis states, the state in R0 is |s〉 (for
s =
∑
i
si =
∑
i
ci,k−1 and s ∈ F) and it can be the final agreed secret. If some players offer superposition
states of basis states, the state of the first n+ 1 registers (that is, R0, C0,0, · · · , Cn−1,0) is a superposition
of the states |
n−1∑
i=0
si〉 ⊗
n−1
i=0 |si〉(si ∈ F) which can be defined as the final secret. We also can measure
the superposition state in the computational basis in Fn+1 and the collapsed state |
n−1∑
i=0
si〉 in R0 can
be considered as a final secret. Note that the the sum of the measurement outcomes of C0,0, · · · , Cn−1,0
should equate the value of R0. If not, there must be something wrong and the scheme should be carried
out again. The specific definition of the final secret can be adapted to different applications and should
be established before performing the scheme.
In summary, the above two schemes where the trusted party is removed demonstrate the feasibility of
the construction method offered by us. But in the first scheme, the conventional recovery procedure needs
to be implemented for n times and then the agreed operations on n private states are needed to gain a
secret . In the second scheme, if all the participants are required to provide basis states, the final secret
can be reconstructed using the conventional recovery procedure only once. Nevertheless, if participants
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are allowed to offer superposition states, the conventional recovery procedure should be employed for n+1
times to generate a secret. In addition, the security of these two scheme largely relies on the conventional
quantum (k, n) threshold scheme since each participant needs it to protect his private state among the
other participants before the secret reconstruction phase.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have given a basic construction of quantum (k, n) threshold schemes without a
trusted party and illustrated its feasibility by offering two schemes. In contrast to previous presented
quantum secret sharing schemes [6–20], in which a trusted party is always needed to assist in generating
and distributing shares among a group of participants, the schemes suggested in this paper require no
trusted party and thus might widen the applicability of quantum threshold schemes to the situation where
there is no single party trusted by all of the participants.
However, the construction method proposed needs the participants to be logically honest during the
secret generation phase since they should provide a proper quantum state; otherwise a single participant
can disrupt the whole scheme and not be detected until the secret reconstruction phase, even though doing
so is of no use for him. Although it is not quite reasonable to make such an expectation, the main intention
of this paper is to demonstrate the necessity and feasibility of sharing a quantum secret without a trusted
party. Particularly, Michael Ben-Or recently suggested us that the techniques used in quantum multiparty
computation [23, 24] may be exploited to propose quantum secret sharing schemes in the absence of a
trusted party where less than half of the participants are not required to play honestly during the secret
generation phase. This invaluable advice shall build a bridge between quantum secret sharing without the
aid of a trusted party and quantum multiparty computing. How to utilize them comprehensively will be
the further work.
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